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Article 7

MEDICINE AND PUBLIC POLICY: LET US LOOK BEFORE
WE LEAP AGAIN
STUART

H.

ROME*

Professor Clark claims health care regulation has failed, primarily
because we are too deferential to the medical profession. I am skeptical
about the analysis that has led him to this conclusion, and I have reservations about his proposed solutions.
In the 1950's and 1960's, the fear of increasing regulation led many
in the medical profession to oppose government sponsored health care
programs. The private health insurance industry and a substantial segment of the population shared (and, with the incumbent administration, still shares) the physicians' fears of socialism and the loss of free
choice. Congress, notwithstanding this resistance, responded to the
enormous public demand for expanded access to valued medical resources by creating Medicaid and Medicare. However, to accommodate
the widespread concern about government intervention, Congress left
much of these programs to the private sector - socializing more the
costs of the services and not so much the providers of the services.
Though doctors have reaped profits from this political defeat, it was a
defeat nonetheless.
The flood of operating funds from Medicaid and Medicare joined
the steady flow of capital funds - from the now-abandoned Hill-Burton program,' tax-exempt revenue bond financing and other government supported programs - to encourage the development of health
care facilities. Medical research and technology, funded by public and
private grants and by profit-motivated investment, found new ways to
spend the new health care dollars. Hospital workers, long underpaid,
demanded and received more adequate compensation. The impact of
all this on our GNP, as Professor Clark observes, has been substantial.
It is a largely predictable and - more to the point -

largely intended

consequence of a widely debated, popularly determined public policy
decision. The political decision to spend more on health care is not
merely -

not even primarily -

an expression of deference to profes-

sional power.
* Partner, Venable, Baetjer & Howard, Baltimore, Maryland; B.A., 1958, Cornell University; LL.B., 1961, Yale University. Mr. Rome's law practice is substantially devoted to
representing hospitals.
1. See The Hill-BurtonAct, 1946-1980: 4synchrony in the Delivery of Health Care to the
Poor, 39 MD. L. REV. 316 (1979).
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Whether or not they have produced a significant measurable improvement in the overall health of our citizenry, our modem health
care programs remain popular. Even in the face of a growing public
appreciation of the high cost of these programs, there has not been any
widespread patient revolt. Ivan Illich 2 fulminates against the medicalization of our society. Lewis Thomas3 counsels restraint in more avuncular tones. Mill Valley turns to holistic health.4 Earnest economists,
researchers, bureaucrats and elected representatives warn us of the extravagance of our folly. But increasing numbers of patients visit increasing numbers of doctors, who prescribe increasing numbers of
increasingly costly treatments and procedures.
Patients want more health care. And so do the rest of us. That is,
even in the absence of direct physician intervention, we are avid consumers of health care goods and services: patent medicines, health spas,
health foods, vitamins, self-help books, gadgets and contraptions of all
sorts and products of the physical fitness industry. We exercise, not because it is good, but because it is good for us - the means to the end of
better health.'
Something complex is going on here. But Professor Clark sees it
rather simply: There is, in the United States, "a socially excessive consumption of medical services." Efforts to regulate health care have
failed. This failure is due mainly to a legal "system of widespread deference to professional power." Eliminate or reduce the professional
power of physicians and all will be well. Let me express my doubts.
I.

ARE THE BENEFITS OF OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

INSUFFICIENT?

Professor Clark does not explain what he means in calling our
consumption of health care services "socially excessive". It is a highly
charged term that is neither self-explanatory nor explained. Presumably, he intends the term to summarize his argument that our society is
utilizing health care services heavily, without deriving benefits commensurate with the high cost.
Professor Clark's argument that health care benefits are insufficient is based almost exclusively on gross studies of short-term changes
2. I. ILLICH,

MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH

(1976).

3. L. THOMAS, The Technology of Medicine, in THE LIVES OF A CELL 31 (1974); id.,
Your Very Good Health 81; L. THOMAS, On Magic in Medicine, in THE MEDUSA AND THE
SNAIL 19 (1979); id., The Health-Care System 45.
4. See Leonard, The Holistic Health Revolution, New West, May 10, 1976, at 40-49.
5. Other self-prescribed cures for our suffering are more mischievous and no less popular: tobacco, marijuana, cocaine, narcotics and alcohol, to name but a few.
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in mortality and morbidity. The morbidity and mortality studies to
which Professor Clark refers are useful. However, they tell us much
less 6 about our health care system than he thinks.
Our system of health care produces much more than reductions in
mortality and morbidity. Moreover, there appears to be a fairly high
degree of satisfaction with these other outputs, many of which cannot
be accurately quantified. To identify the most obvious benefits,7 apparent to any hospital visitor:
the alleviation of pain, suffering and anxiety
food and shelter
nursing care
rehabilitation
the employment of large numbers of skilled, semi-skilled and
unskilled workers in useful labor that produces goods and services intended to promote positive human and social values
a market for goods and services produced by others
education, research and innovation
- philanthropy, volunteerism and other activities that foster social cohesion and stability and community security and
strength
an outlet for our Western need to resist fate
peripheral economic and social activity that is less harmful
than many alternatives.
Professor Clark ignores these benefits. He ignores, also, the gains from
extending health care services to the poor, the aged and the disabled
and the gains from the increased employment and improved compensation of hospital workers - gains in health status, in social justice and
in political stability. Finally, he ignores the economic gains from returning to the workforce patients whose mortality may be unaffected by
medical intervention but whose illnesses, in former times, would have
disabled them longer, perhaps even permanently.
Undoubtedly, these benefits could be purchased more cheaply. It
does not follow from this, however, that the benefits are not worth
purchasing at all.
II.

HAS HEALTH CARE REGULATION FAILED?

Professor Clark's assertion that health care regulation has failed
6. And, as Professor Teret and Dr. Miller make clear in their response to Professor
Clark, much more.
7. Also obvious is the costly practice of defensive medicine. Whether or not it is beneficial is debatable. Beyond debate is the proposition that defensive medicine is not the product
of "widespread deference to professional power."
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would seem to warrant careful documentation, beginning with a definition of the objectives of the regulation and extending to a cogent, detailed presentation of the results. This he has not done. The evidence
of regulatory failure cited by Professor Clark seems quite sketchy. The
troika of regulatory programs the effectiveness of which he disparages
- utilization review, health planning (certificate of need) and rate regulation - have been in operation for a rather brief period. None had
objectives quite so grandiose as those that Professor Clark's readers
might infer.8 Although some of the studies cited by Professor Clark
may support his conclusion that the results of these regulatory constraints have been disappointing, we simply do not know, and cannot
know, how much more expansive and costly health care would have
been without these regulatory constraints.
Others, who have more vested interests in the utilization review,
health planning and rate regulation programs, surely can plead their
cases better than I. However, let me say from the perspective of a lawyer representing Maryland hospitals, that each of these programs has
had a clearly perceptible restraining effect. This is especially true of
health planning and rate regulation. The planners and rate reviewers,
in direct actions, have disapproved capital projects, new programs and
rate increases. Their indirect impact, perhaps, is even greater. The mere
existence of these regulatory programs has increased the numbers of
those hospital trustees, managers and consultants who counsel restraint
and has increased their credibility. Quite often, rather than face battle
with the bureaucrats, hospitals have abandoned proposed capital
projects, new programs and rate increases or trimmed them down,
without any direct bureaucratic participation or awareness.
III.

Is

LEGAL DEFERENCE TO THE MEDICAL PROFESSION THE
MAJOR FACTOR UNDERMINING HEALTH CARE
REGULATION?

While I share some of Professor Clark's feeling that we sometimes
defer to the medical profession when we should not, it seems to me that
he substantially overstates his case. Deference to the medical profession
is not, to my mind, the big monkey wrench in the regulatory machinery
he claims it to be.
8. Utilization review was intended, not to make wholesale changes in the norms of
medical practice, but to curtail unnecessary, costly deviations from these norms. Maryland's
model rate review legislation speaks of assuring hospital solvency, the reasonableness of
costs in relation to services offered, the reasonableness of charges in relation to costs and the
elimination of undue discrimination among purchasers. It contains not a word about reducing costs, nor about curtailing services. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 568H-568Y (1980).
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Other, more obvious factors contribute more significantly to what
Professor Clark loosely terms "the current situation". First among these
is our tremendous appetite for health care; second, the political commitment to extend the perceived benefits of health care to the poor, the
aged and the disabled; and, third, the reciprocal lack of broad public
support for Professor Clark's prescribed health care diet. Health care
services are popular; the denial of medical services is not. The limited
success of health care regulation is largely due to limited public
support.
While Professor Clark sees these public attitudes as but symptoms
of public deference to physicians, I rather think that deference is itself
but a symptom of a very complex combination of forces at work in
modem society and, perhaps, imbedded in human nature. Indeed, Professor Clark gives partial recognition to this possibility when he says
that "the proper stance of the law toward professionals - any and all
professionals - is a very deep and difficult problem," that it "is a
profound and basic fact of our society, and [in addition to economic
analysis] it must also be examined in psychological, social, and political
terms." We should contemplate the full significance of this insight. Our
attitudes toward health care and physicians are complicated, varied
and irrational, rooted in obscure impulses not easily altered by reasoned discourse.
Increases in health care costs, of course, are encouraged by the
combination of economic factors identified by Professor Clark - most
significantly, a lavish system of insurance, the prevalence of fee-forservice reimbursement and the relative lack of incentives for restraint.
However, to see these arrangements as Professor Clark does - as little
more than a manifestation of unchecked professional power - is historically, politically, economically, sociologically, psychologically and
metaphysically inadequate. Hospitals, for example, favor increased
health care benefits, support fee-for-service medicine, seek to expand
and resist regulation for reasons having almost nothing whatever to do
with the influence of physicians. What business does not want to increase production and sales, please its customers, reduce costs, construct impressive buildings and resist government control? The
behavior of hospitals in these matters is similar to that of virtually all
corporations, most especially those in the profit seeking sector far from
the health care system and the influence of physicians.
The somewhat disappointing results of utilization review, health
planning and rate control are due, also, to ignorance. We know little of
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the mechanisms of illness and even less about those of healing. 9 There
is little consensus on theprecise definition of the problems to which the
new regulatory laws are addressed and even less regardingprecisesolutions. We lack the expertise that the enabling legislation seems to have
contemplated. Although utilization review is run by doctors, health
planning and rate review are not; the occasional participation of physicians in these latter activities is usually ornamental and almost always
ineffectual.' 0 Of the fourteen specific review criteria mandated by the
federal health planning laws, only four raise, even peripherally, medical issues on which the particular expertise and authority of physicians
can be brought to bear with any significant force." In rate review, the
regulators are bent on defining health care issues, not in medical terms,
but in economic terms that physicians can neither comprehend readily
nor respond to effectively. Health planning and rate review are striking
examples of delegations of vast power to non-physicians - putative
experts whose competence was not first conclusively demonstrated to
be adequate to the tasks assigned to them.
Health planning is in the grip of demographers, other statisticians,
public health officers and the like. Their analytical tools are limited and
in an early stage of development. Their predictive methods and standards are frequently faulty and, because they are largely mandated by
law or regulation, often inflexible. Thus, health planners find it difficult
to earn respect. The complex resource allocation issues they address are
resolved politically more often than through deference to their limited
expertise, even though the law indulges them with the presumption that
this expertise is genuine.
Rate review, at least in Maryland, is in the hands of economists,
accountants and the like. Their data collection and econometrics leave
much to be desired. They simply cannot identify and quantify all of the
factors affecting cost and quality. Their success, it appears, is due
mainly to their considerable powers of intimidation, to regulatory lag
and to the hospitals' general support of their efforts to contain costs and

9. The well known efficacy of placebos in some cases and the demand for laetrile and
other false cures should be much more humbling than it is to those who believe that the
health care enterprise can be governed by reason alone.
10. In this observer's experience, most conscientious regulators involved in health care
planning and rate review are not conspicuously deferential toward the medical profession.
Nor do they often blame the medical profession and its influence for inhibiting their effectiveness. Typically, they blame the lawmakers, the law, lawyers and - as Dr. Cohen's comments in this issue illustrate - our legal system of due process.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 300n-l(c) (Supp. III 1979).
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to promote rate equity' 2 among payors.
IV.

Is THE LAW EXCESSIVELY DEFERENTIAL TO THE
MEDICAL PROFESSION?

I am in broad agreement with Professor Clark's assertion that our
society often is inappropriately deferential toward the medical profession. 13 However, this is not to say that I agree with the particulars of his
argument. As the foregoing discussion indicates, I find some of it factually inaccurate and much of it stridently polemical, infused with a medical nihilism that is not likely to gain the favor of the American public
in the foreseeable future. It is curious that Professor Clark does not
seem to recognize that deference to physicians is eroding, that respect
for physicians is diminishing and that intrusions into the physician-patient relationship are increasing. 4
Professor Clark's discussions of malpractice, consent to treatment,
education and licensure warrant further comment.
The most striking aspect of recent developments in malpractice
law is not deference to physicians, as Professor Clark insists, but the
opposite: the erosion of local norms as standards of acceptable physician conduct, the breach of the conspiracy of silence and the steady rise
in the standard of due care required of physicians. The law of malpractice, like much of negligence law, is ruled by norms of behavior. It is
hardly surprising that those who are most expert in what constitutes the
exercise of due care by a physician are those who by training and experience are themselves physicians. The failure of the judiciary to mandate studies of the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of medical procedures
is characteristic of the relatively passive function of the judiciary in our
12. Generally, "rate equity" means increasing payments from Blue Cross, Medicaid and
Medicare to cover a fair share of the costs of bad debts and charity care.
13. I agree, also, that our society often is inappropriately non-deferential toward the
medical profession. Consider for example, the Surgeon General's losing battle against the
tobacco industry.
14. It should be useful to analyze the causes and extent of the erosion of professional
autonomy and the effects of that erosion; to make value judgments about the desirability of
the various forces at work; and to make recommendations for the improvement of their
interaction. The newer regulatory programs and policies - utilization review, health planning, rate review, institutional review, informed consent and so on - clearly must be included among the causes of the decline in professional autonomy. I think Professor Clark
might even agree with this judgment. His point seems to be only that these programs and
policies are too rooted in the old-fashioned notion of doctor-knows-best and simply do not
go far enough. Other causal factors would seem to include the shift from community practice to hospital practice, from individual practice to group practice and from general practice
to specialty practice; the growing socio-economic gulf between physicians and patients; and
the high use of technology and physician extenders.
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Anglo-American system of adversarial jurisprudence and cannot fairly
be ascribed to judicial deference to physicians. Malpractice litigation
has had an enormous inhibiting impact on the behavior of physicians.
It has promoted the practice of defensive medicine, at enormous cost
and with questionable benefits.
The doctrine of informed consent bases "a physician's duty to disclose. . . on the patient's need to know rather than on customary practice" and, therefore, as Professor Clark acknowledges, is not an
example of deference to physicians. It is a signifcant incursion on professional autonomy - within the area of professional expertise - and
has gained significant acceptance in the nine years since its first judicial
elaboration in Canterburyv. Spence. I Contrary to Professor Clark's assertion, the doctrine does involve judicial evaluation of efficacy, in two
respects. First, it requires physicians to explain accurately and fully to
their patients the probable results of treatment alternatives, including
the alternative of no treatment at all. Second, if a patient claims that,
had he been fully informed, he would not have consented to the treatment performed on him, the validity of this subjective assertion will be
measured by an objective standard: what a fully informed reasonable
person would have done in like circumstances. While it is true that
malpractice cases do not often raise the issue of informed consent,' 6 the
more significant fact of the matter is that the doctrine of informed consent has had a significant impact on the practice of medicine. It is promoted by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, the
American Hospital Association and others. It is the law of Maryland
and seems to be widely adhered to, although it perplexes many physicians and may cause their patients unnecessary anguish.
If one concedes that physicians are expert in the diagnosis and
treatment of disease, it would be altogether reasonable to defer to their
expertise in matters of physician education and licensure and to entrust
to them the supervision of less qualified non-physician medical personnel. Professor Clark disagrees. In the thrall of a Jacksonian impulse to
reject this expertise, he urges us to give serious consideration to proposals "to reform and liberalize, if not abolish, health licensing laws." This
seemingly egalitarian notion, upon more careful consideration, is in
15. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See Annot., 88
A.L.R.3d 1008 (1978).
16. The reasons are familiar to any malpractice lawyer and have nothing whatever to do
with any supposed deference to physicians. If physician negligence can be established,

whether or not consent was obtained is immaterial. Most hospitals routinely obtain signed
consent forms. To prevail in a consent case, the plaintiff must assume the heavy burden of
proving objectively that a fully informed reasonable patient in the plaintiffs same circumstances would have refused to consent. And so on.
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fact rather elitist. The well-to-do and better educated are better
equipped than the poor and poorly educated to find competent care.
Professor Clark's analysis would gain considerable persuasive
force if he more assiduously pursued a distinction of which he undoubtedly is aware but which he seems to regard as largely insignificant. I refer to the distinction between deferring to a professional acting
within his area of expertise, which to me seems appropriate, and deferring to a professional in matters beyond his expertise, which to me
seems inappropriate. It is all too common for hospital administrators,
trustees, health planners, rate regulators and others to fail to make this
distinction. Of course, doctors fail to make it, too. This functional deference warrants careful study. It may account for more that is undesirable in our health care system than the formal deference described by
Professor Clark's legal analysis. Defining the boundaries of appropriate
professional prerogatives is a useful undertaking. It has contributed
largely to the development of the doctrine of informed consent, by requiring the physician to present all of the material facts within his expertise and reserving to the patient the ultimate decision of whether or
not to submit himself to the physician's proposed intervention. It also
has led to the involvement of ethicists and other non-physicians in
keeping a close guard on the use
by physicians of human subjects in
17
programs.
medical
experimental
V.

ARE PROFESSOR CLARK'S PROPOSALS FOR CURTAILING
PROFESSIONAL POWER HELPFUL?

Professor Clark correctly recognizes the great social value of "the
adoption by service providers of a fiduciary attitude." But he substantially ignores the full significance of this attitude. It produces a measure
of self-restraint, voluntary peer review (formal and informal), continuing education, uncompensated care, preventive medicine and other
17. Starting with the Nuremberg war crime trials, concern about the misuse of medical
experimentation has grown steadily, both in the United States and abroad. This concern was
expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki adopted by the World Medical Assembly in 1964,
revised and adopted by the 29th World Medical Assembly in Tokyo in 1975. In the United
States, the American Medical Association established ethical guidelines stressing the need
for fully informed and uncoerced patient/subject consent. The reports of two specially commissioned groups, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174 (1978), and the Belmont Report, 44
Fed. Reg. 23,192 (1979), expressed deep concern over the need to temper the physician's
quest for knowledge with the protection afforded potential human subjects by the review by
non-physicians of proposals for experimentation. The current federal regulations, 46 Fed.
Reg. 8942 (1981) (to be codified in scattered sections of 21 C.F.R.) and 46 Fed. Reg. 8366
(1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 46), require the presence of ethicists and other nonphysicians on an institutional review board.
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practices against narrow self-interest that, however flawed the system,
may well be more than the law could successfully coerce. Clearly, what
helps to sustain this fiduciary attitude are many of the instances of deference with which Professor Clark finds fault, particularly those regarding education and licensure. For this reason, some measure of
deference should be preserved, even if total autonomy is not.
All of us, including physicians, should welcome Professor Clark's
suggestion that we study the efficacy of the medical school curriculum
and licensing requirements and seek to improve them. Similarly, we
should welcome continuing, expanded research into the efficacy of current medical practices and alternatives.'" Professor Clark's proposed
federal commission on medical technologies undoubtedly could develop information that should be useful in articulating government
health care reimbursement programs. These programs, in turn, could
be expected to exert an influence on the norms of professional practice.
So far, so good. But Professor Clark would go further. He would empower his federal bureaucracy of wholly independent technocrats, "doing the best they could on the basis of available evidence" - an
astonishingly lenient standard that ignores any consideration of the
probity of that evidence - to make binding determinations of both
clinical effectiveness and cost effectiveness and, based on these determinations, to make binding reimbursement determinations. His commission thereby could effectively impose a medical orthodoxy having life
and death consequences, by refusing to fund certain medical practices
altogether and by restricting the funding of certain other medical practices to certain defined classes of patients and circumstances. Professor
Clark's argument that the influence on health care policy of professionals practicing medicine has been excessive and should be reduced does
not to my mind support his suggestion that we should place the power
to make binding decisions on the complex resource allocation and ethical questions of health care in the hands of a small cadre of remote
bureaucrats practicing cost-benefit analysis.' 9
18. Professor Clark seems to assume that his proposed commission on medical technologies would reduce health care costs. This is by no means certain. It might produce a call for
more extensive health care programs at greater direct cost, to assure greater long term social
and economic benefit. For example, massive preventive health programs, which may have
significant impact on morbidity, are quite costly. They seek to influence the behavior of
large, inattentive, intractable populations - the potentially ill - without altogether eliminating the cost of care of those who, notwithstanding the preventive effort, actually fall victim to the disease under attack. Hypertension would appear to be just such a case.
19. If Professor Clark is correct in his judgment that health regulation has failed, he
should recognize that this failure is in part a failure in the use of a kind of countervailing
professional power quite similar to that of his proposed commission on medical technologies. See text accompanying notes 9 to 12 supra.
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Cost-benefit analysis in the area of health care policy is truly voodoo economics. The variables are too numerous and too complex; too
many of the operative values are non-economic and cannot be accurately assigned dollar values. It is a morally repugnant false science.
There is no reason to believe that the cost-benefit analysts are any better than the rest of us at fixing the value of compassion, hope, avoiding
pain or prolonging life. These are not economic issues, and we should
resist the impulse to so professionalize them by ceding to economists
the conclusive determinative power to price them - or to ignore them.
We should not trade what Professor Clark regards as excessive deference to physicians for what I believe would be excessive deference to
Professor Clark's array of biochemists, biostatisticians, epidemiologists,
economists and public policy analysts. If, as now seems inevitable, the
federal government is going to ration health care, let us endorse an
open political process for making these decisions, rather than enshrine
the unproven - and, I submit, altogether spurious - expertise of people who call themselves cost-benefit analysts. As the furor over abortion seems to suggest, the dramatic issues of health care cannot be
effectively removed from the normal political processes of a democratic
society.
The practice of medicine, though we tend to forget it, is an art that
reflects many of the enduring and transient values and beliefs of the
society in which it is conducted. One of the hallmarks of our medical
profession has been its impulse to improve itself. As the inappropriateness of procedures is demonstrated and accepted, doctors tend to abandon them. This harbingers well for Professor Clark's suggestion that we
devote more resources to studying the effectiveness of our currently accepted medical and surgical treatments and procedures. Our experience
with health care regulation to date suggests, however, that, before
norms of health care are legally imposed by a non-physician bureaucracy, an extended trial period of voluntary compliance would be appropriate. In any event, we should wait until we have a firm solution to
the "key problem" which Professor Clark helpfully has identified:
"how - or whether - inexpert lay persons can control expert professionals without making things even worse."

